The LTE/SAE (Long Term Evolution/System Architecture Evolution) architecture design is greatly different from the existing network (3G) which brings with it a need to adapt and improve the security functions. In fact, the security issues in telecommunications networks will be surely a big discussion subject in the next few years whither the delay remains very important and should be minimized. Thus, the Handover Keying Working Group (HOKEY) tries to reduce the delay caused by the authentication once the mobile user changes its location. Therefore, the focus of this paper is to make a brief discussion of the IETF HOKEY solution to fast authenticate the subscribers during the handover in the LTE/SAE network.
Introduction
Nowadays, the security is the blessed part of any communications system. For this reason, the next generation mobile telecommunication system (LTE/SAE) is being prototyped for increased security and reliable communication. Accordingly, it has several key differences compared to 3G and older versions like that the 4G network will become totally IP-Based. So, it will solve a lot of problem in terms of interoperability across heterogeneous network environment but it will poses greater risks in terms of safety and reliability. Furthermore, the mobility improvement is very important in any wireless network. For this, the handover in LTE/SAE will be more frequent and should become more crucial, especially for the real-time services.
The purpose of this paper is to present a brief presentation of the LTE/SAE network architecture in which we define some handover technologies. Next, we explain the security architecture used by LTE/SAE network in which we specify the security architecture used in the handover. Finally, we present and discuss the HOKEY WG's proposal.
4G LTE/SAE network overview
The LTE/SAE objective as a 4G standard for wireless communication is to be IP-based and have the minimum of networks elements to minimize the protocol processing, latency and the deployment costs. And especially, increases security and reliable communications [1] [2].
LTE/SAE architecture
The LTE/SAE network architecture contains two main parts: the Evolved UTRAN (E-UTRAN) and the Evolved Packet Core (EPC). In fact, the first part includes one or more evolved NodeBs (eNB) which is responsible of radio transmission and reception with the mobile user while the EPC contains the following five elements:
Mobility Management Entity (MME) which is the main signaling node that is responsible for initiating paging and authentication of the mobile device.
Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) which supports service policies for data flow detection, enforcement and flow-based client charging.
Serving Gateway which routes and forwards the user data packets. PDN gateway which provides connectivity from the mobile user to external packet data networks by being the point of exit and entry of traffic for the mobile user.
Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is the subscribers' database which contains the static subscriber information and the authentication and security data that can be used for authentication of the subscriber and encryption of user traffic[1] [3] . 
Handover mechanism in LTE/SAE network
The transparent access to services is among the objectives of E-UTRAN which is guaranteed by using the handover mechanism. Therefore, the use of this mechanism should reduce the latency requirements of the system. In fact, the wireless communication system supports the following two main handover mechanisms:
The hard handover means that the mobile user should be detached from the source eNB before it attaches to the destination eNB.
The soft handover means that the mobile user should be attached to the destination eNB while it still attached to the source eNB.
Indeed, the handover decisions in LTE/SAE system are executed in the eNBs itself by exchanging the necessary information between each other. Also, the eNB doesn't involve the MME/SGW only when the handover is complete which the MME/SGW switches the path (see bellow fig. 2 ). 
4G LTE/SAE security architecture
As mentioned above, the security is a big issue in the telecommunications networks such as the LTE/SAE network. Therefore, the LTE/SAE should be more secure than the 3G network and especially should have a strengthened defense against the current attacks from the Internet without doing any change in the USIM card. For this, the LTE/SAE introduces a new keys generation system in which the keys are generated for different purposes [5] .
Security architecture
Firstly, the most important issue of security under LTE/SAE network is the network access, which protects the communications between the mobile user and the network across the radio interface. In fact, the security architecture of network access contains 4 functions:
Authentication: It is completed by the use of a mutual authentication between the network and the mobile user in which the EPC accepts the mobile user to use its own services and the mobile user concludes that this is a real network.
Confidentiality: It is guaranteed by the using of a static and confidential user's identity called IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) which is needed to clone any mobile user. Thus, the LTE avoids the use of IMSI by using a temporary identity called TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity), when it wants to communicate with the mobile user.
Ciphering: It ensured by using of encryption algorithms which prevents any intruder to read the messages exchanges between the mobile and network.
Integrity protection: It protects the system against the problems by detecting any attempt to modify the signaling messages exchanges between the mobile user and the network by any intruder. [6] .
Hierarchical key system
The security system in LTE/SAE network is based on a hierarchical key system which depends on a specific key, denoted K, stored in the HSS and USIM's card. In fact, this key derives two specific keys used in the 3G network: a ciphering key (C K ) and an integrity key (I k ). Thereafter, the LTE uses these keys to derive another key called access security management entity key, denoted K ASME . With this, the MME and the mobile user derive three further keys that will be used for the communications between them. The first two keys are K NASenc and K NASint which are used for ciphering and integrity protection of a non access stratum (NAS) signaling messages. While the last one is an eNodeB key, denoted K eNB in which derives three new keys used for ciphering of data (K UPenc ), ciphering of RRC signaling messages (K RRCenc ) and integrity protection of RRC signaling messages (K RRCint ) in the access stratum (AS) (see figure 3 ) [6] . The use of this system brings several benefits such as the mobile user doesn't lose the value of C K and I K even if it disconnect from the network, whereas the MME keep the value of K ASME . Due to this, the system secures the next attachment of the mobile user to the network. Likewise, it ensures that the keys are separated, so, the discovery of one will not help anyone to know the other one.
Authentication and Key Agreement
To ensure at least the same security level as the 3G network, the LTE use the AKA procedure which the mobile user confirms the network's identity and the network confirms the mobile's identity. The figure bellow illustrates this AKA procedure: Fig. 4 . AKA procedure Before starting the AKA procedure, the MME obtains the mobile's identifier from its own database or from the last MME where the mobile user was attached to. Otherwise, it can ask the mobile user itself by an EMM Identity Request. After that, it requests the HSS to get the specific key and the authentication vector which contains the following elements:
RAND: A random number which serves as one of the input parameters to generate the other parameters of the vector.
XRES: The expected result of RAND which is used to authenticate the mobile user. AUTN: The authentication token which is used to block any intruder to replace any authentication request.
K ASME : The access security management entity key. Afterward, The MME sends RAND and AUTN to the mobile user to verify that the network knows the real value of its security key K. In the same time the mobile user generates RES, which is the result of RAND received from the MME and its own security key K. Then, it returns the result to the MME to compare it with the value received from the HSS. In case the values of RES and XRES are equal, the MME conclude that the mobile is genuine [6] .
Security activation
Firstly, the NAS security is activated when the AKA procedure is finished. In this case, the MME calculates the values of K NASenc and K NASint and asks the mobile user to activate this security. Then, the mobile calculates its own copies of K NASenc and K NASint and then begins the ciphering and the integrity protection with the network. However, the mobile user and the MME delete these keys if the mobile disconnect from the network but the MME keeps its copy of KASME, while the mobile user keeps its copies of CK and IK.
Otherwise, the AS's security is activated before that the network establishes the default radio bearer and signaling radio bearer. In this case, the eNB use its own key to generate the three keys that the mobile use will use for ciphering and integrity protection. Finally, the mobile user acknowledges the eNB and starts the downlink ciphering [6] .
Ciphering
The ciphering procedure is guaranteed by combining the outgoing data with the pseudo-random key stream using an exclusive-OR operation. This pseudo-random key stream is generated by the ciphering key of the transmitter with some information fields. In the same time, the receiver recovers the original data by doing the same mixing process. Currently, LTE supports three EPS (Evolved Packet System) encryption algorithms (EEAs) which are SNOW 3G and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [6] .
Integrity protection
The integrity protection is guaranteed by using the EIA (EPS integrity algorithm) algorithm to send any signaling message. In fact, the transmitter use the appropriate integrity protection key to generate an integrity field denoted MAC-I. In the same time, the receiver separates the integrity field from the signaling message and calculates its own integrity field, denoted XMAC-I. Therefore, if the two integrity fields are not the same, the receiver concludes that the message has been modified and it will be discarded.
Security in Handover process
The installation of an eNB in an exposed area creates a high risk of unauthorized access to it, so adequate security is required. To achieve that, the concept of forward security was introduced to LTE. This means that the computational complexity prevents guessing the future K eNB which will be used between the mobile user and the target eNB. Thereby, the figure 5 shows the handover key chaining model used for intra-LTE handovers. Generally, the MME generates and sent to the serving eNB an initial key denoted K eNB . In fact, the source eNB always derives a new eNB key denoted K eNB* and sent it to the target eNB during any intra-or inter-eNB handover. Thus, this eNB uses this key to derive the base key that will be used for deriving the ciphering and integrity keys [5] [7] .
HOKEY WG security architecture proposal
As we see before, the mobile user needs to re-authenticate each time it changes its location. Therefore, this process consumes the latency due to the signaling overhead and it creates a series of security vulnerabilities due to the longer lasting exposure of the medium. Also, this re-authentication generates a time-delay. Accordingly, a work was done by the HOKEY work group in order to reduce this delay. This work was progressed in two ways: The first one is to do an early authentication which means that the mobile user should be authenticate before doing the handover while the second is to reuse the cryptographic material generated during an initial authentication.
Likewise, the HOKEY proposal suggests the reduction of the signaling overhead by minimizing the communication between the mobile user and the home servers and especially for the authentication. Furthermore, if the authentication service depends on a remote server, the network partition can result in the denial of service to valid users.
HOKEY architecture functionalities
Accordingly, HOKEY architecture requires the following functionalities:
Authentication Subsystem Function which depends on the availability of the discovery of the target access point (TAP).
Pre-Authentication Function which assure the discovery of the TAPs and completes the network access authentication and authorization at each TAP before the handover.
EAP Re-Authentication Function which assures the authentication of the mobile user at any access point and by using the key material derived from a previous full EAP authentication.
EAP Authentication Function which assures the authentication of the mobile user at any access point using a full EAP exchange.
Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) Function which assures the pre-placing of key material derived from an initial full EAP authentication on TAPs.
Management of EAP-Based Handover Keys which consists of EAP method-independent key derivation and distribution and comprises the following specific functions: handover key derivation and handover key distribution.
HOKEY architecture components
The components of the HOKEY architecture are as follows:
Peer is the extremity of the link which communicates with the authenticator. Authenticator is one that initiates the EAP authentication. EAP server is one that terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer. ER server is one that performs the server portion of ERP and terminates the EAP re-authentication exchange with the peer.
ER/AAK server is the one that doing the AAK function [1] [8] .
Conclusion
In this paper, the HOKEY WG architecture proposal was presented. In fact, EAP, that supports different types of authentication methods, is used for authentication in almost every access networks such as LTE. So, it can result delay degradation while the mobile change each attachment from one base station to another. For this, ERP is developed to minimize this delay and the interactions between the mobile and authenticator. But, the needed of requesting the authenticator, for re-authentication parameters, can degrade the delay of the reauthentication especially if the authenticator is too far from the mobile for example in case of the mobile is located in the visited network. Therefore, the solution of reusing the cryptographic material generated during an initial authentication can save the time. In LTE, this solution is used by the keeping of K ASME key in MME but the discovery of this key by an intruder can create a high risk to discover the derived keys. So, the intruder can use the network without any problem. While, doing an early authentication before the handover can decrease also the delay of re-authentication and solve also the problem of an access to a false base station. However, using the AAK can help a base station to differentiate between an EAP early authentications from an EAP re-authentication.
